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Estimates of labour supply effects of recent UK reforms in the area of direct taxes and bene-
fits show that policy can have significant influence on the level of employment. We confirm 
this in a simulation of in-work support system introduced into the German tax and benefit 
system. Our simulation results suggest that introducing in-work Tax Credits in Germany 
would increase employment of single individuals by over 100,000 but it would result in a 
reduction of labour supply among individuals living in couples by about 70,000. We find that 
Tax Credits would result in significant reductions of labour supply both among women and 
men in two earner couples. The result found for men is especially important as it is markedly 
different from all results found for the UK, where the overall response among men has always 
been found positive. Our estimation results call for a high degree of caution as far as “import-
ing” UK-style Tax Credits to Germany is concerned. In-work support based on family income 
would reinforce the existing work disincentives for secondary earners through joint income 
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This paper is a contribution confirming that financial incentives are of great importance for 
individual labour supply behaviour, and that careful changes in the design of the tax and bene-
fit system may be an effective way towards increasing employment. We demonstrate this 
using a detailed comparison of employment statistics for Germany and Great Britain which 
reflects a high degree of heterogeneity in differences in employment rates between the two 
countries for different types of families. Since, regardless of individual family status, people 
in each country face similar labour market conditions (concerning labour demand and labour 
market regulations) these findings stress the importance which financial incentives play in 
determining the individual employment position. The role of financial incentives is also con-
firmed by the changes in employment status of certain family types in the UK (especially 
among lone parents and fathers of young children) following a series of reforms to the tax and 
benefit system during the years of the Labour Government.  
We also demonstrate that, as far as generosity of the income support (social assistance) sys-
tem is concerned, the “popular belief” that support at the lower end of the incomes distribu-
tion is significantly higher in Germany does not hold. We show this for a number of stylized 
households using two microsimulation models: TAXBEN for the UK, and STSM for Ger-
many. What we find is in fact that it is often the case that the tax and benefit system is more 
generous in Germany than in the UK at higher levels of income but not at the lowest ones. 
This implies that if one were to use the UK as a “role model” for adjustments in the generos-
ity of benefits in Germany, there is actually little room for manoeuvre at the lower end of the 
income distribution.  
Finally, our analysis of budget constraints in Germany and the UK clearly reflects the two 
most important differences between the tax and benefit systems: the joint taxation of couples 
(Germany), and the in-work support (UK). The move from joint to individual taxation in the 
UK was completed in 1999 with the abolition of joint taxation and its replacement with a 
child-related tax credit in April 2000. In Germany couples can still file a joint tax claim. In a 
recent analysis, Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) show that the employment rate of secondary 
earners in Germany would markedly increase when moving from joint taxation to individual 
taxation.  Discussion Papers   555 
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The main part of our analysis focuses on the second difference between the tax and benefit 
systems in the two countries, namely in-work support. This fiscal instrument, which aims at 
subsidising low pay employment, has been operational in several countries (e.g. US, Canada 
and the UK) and there have been suggestions that in-work support could be used to make 
employment more attractive in Germany as well. We use a discrete choice labour supply 
model to estimate the labour market implications of introducing UK-style in-work support in 
Germany. Our model follows the analysis of Blundell et al. (2000) who estimate the labour 
supply effects of the WFTC in the UK. In a similar study for France, Germany and Finland, 
Bargain and Orsini (2005) simulate the effects of in-work credits on labour supply of women. 
We extend their analysis by allowing both men and women to respond to changes in financial 
incentives. This turns out to be of decisive importance as far as policy suggestions are con-
cerned.  
Our estimates show that because of important income effects on secondary earners the poli-
cies would have high negative implications for employment of individuals in couples – both 
men and women. These negative effects nearly outweigh the positive effects on lone parents; 
the total employment effect of introducing UK-style in-work support in Germany is positive 
but modest given the cost of the reform (in the range of about 40,000 individuals). This result 
together with some more detailed analysis of differences in employment rates between Britain 
and Germany leads us to conclude that changing the structure of financial incentives in Ger-
many could certainly be used to encourage employment. However, given the strong negative 
employment response among couples, we conclude that in-work support based on total family 
incomes would not be an effective way of encouraging employment in Germany. A solution 
could come in the form of an individual tax credit integrated with some form of childcare 
subsidy. Simply “importing” the in-work support system from the UK will not “do the trick”. 
This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we present a comparison of employment 
statistics between Great Britain and Germany. This is followed by a comparison of budget 
constraints for several stylised family types in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe our ap-
proach to modelling labour supply in Germany and present details of how we model UK-style 
New Tax Credits in the German tax and benefit system. Results of simulating the introduction 
of NTCs in Germany are presented in Section 5. In section 6 we return to the comparison of 
employment statistics and budget constraints to identify welfare reforms which may be better 
suited for Germany than a UK-style in-work support system. Discussion Papers   555 
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2  Britain and Germany compared – employment rates 
International comparisons of economic indicators and statistics are complicated by, among 
other things, differences in institutional frameworks. Britain and Germany, for example, have 
very different education and pension systems and both of these strongly influence the result-
ing labour market statistics. Although we limit our analysis in this paper to individuals aged 
between 25 and 59, important differences in labour market outcomes due to institutional de-
sign exist between the two countries and these are presented below. Subsequently we focus on 
detailed comparisons of employment rates, defined as the share of dependently employed and 
self employed people over the whole population in this age group.2 The institutional differ-
ence will obviously carry through to affect comparisons of employment rates. Yet, we believe 
that limiting the scope of analysis by further narrowing of the age criteria would risk making 
the analysis uninteresting from the policy point of view. On the other hand the population 
groups where we see highest differences in employment rates are unlikely to be either stu-
dents or retired people.  
Labour market status 
Our analysis is based on the Family Resources Survey (FRS) for Great Britain and the Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) for Germany. The FRS is an annual cross sectional survey which 
contains information on about 25,000 households, representing the total of 24.5 million Brit-
ish households. The GSOEP is a representative sample of private households living in Ger-
many and includes detailed information about the socio-economic situation of over 11,000 
households (representing about 38.8 million households living in Germany). Both surveys 
contain detailed information on household incomes, hours worked and household structure.3 
We compare data for the two countries for 2002/03.4 Table 1 contains the basic breakdown by 
labour market status for Germany and Britain as a starting point for our analysis. 
                                                                          
2 The comparison of labour markets focuses on employment rates rather than on unemployment or labour force 
participation rates which are the two most obvious other measures, to limit the definitional and institutional differ-
ences existing between Britain and Germany concerning the unemployed.   
3 A description of the SOEP can be downloaded from www.diw.de/soep; see also Haisken-DeNew and Frick 
(2003). 
4 For Germany, we use the data colleted in 2003 as they contain the information about the fiscal year 2002. The 
FRS data is collected to overlap with the government budget calendar, i.e. from April to March. When we refer to 
a dataset as a 2002/03 data set this means that we consider the dataset for April 2002 – March 2003. Discussion Papers   555 
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Table 1. Labour market status. UK and Germany, 2002/03. 
 Breakdown  in  % 
 UK  Germany 
  men women men women 
Employees  70.09 64.7 68.46  61.54 
Self-employed  12.74 5.07 10.86 5.20 
Students  0.34 0.36 6.90 5.60 
Retired  0.21 0.55 2.88 2.27 
Unoccupied  16.63 29.32 10.90 25.39 
 Source: FRS 2002/03 and GSOEP 2003. 
The overall employment rate in Britain (counting both the employees and the self-employed) 
is 3.5 percentage points higher for men and 3 percentage points higher for women in Britain 
than in Germany. At the same time however the proportion of students and early-retirees is 
much higher in Germany and this leads to lower proportion of individuals classified as “unoc-
cupied”.5 Bearing in mind the differences in student and retiree status between the two coun-
tries in our chosen age group below we present employment rates separately for lone people 
and individuals living in couples (married and cohabiting).  
Employment rates 
The employment rates are presented for different family types, distinguished by the presence 
of children younger than 17 years. The picture that emerges from tables 2-4 is (unsurpris-
ingly) that the patterns of employment are strongly related to family structure. What is strik-
ing though, is that there are important differences in employment conditional on these charac-
teristics between the UK and Germany.  
The overall employment rate in Germany for single people is slightly higher than in the UK 
(see Table 2), and this difference results from much higher employment rates of single 
women in Germany (4.3 percentage point difference).6 Disaggregating employment statistics 
for single adults depending on whether they have children (below 17 years old) or not also 
gives higher employment rates for Germany, this time by over 10 percentage points. This 
could seem at odds with the existing in-work support system in the UK which provids incen-
tives for labour market employment of lone parents. However, as table A1 in the Appendix 
                                                                          
5 These levels are consistent with OECD statistics on employment for the two countries (see OECD, 2005). 
6 This is mainly due to the higher labour market participation of women in east Germany. As documented in 
previous literature, due to the different history the labour market behaviour of women between east and west 
Germany is still quite different, see e.g. (Steiner and Haan, 2005). Discussion Papers   555 
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shows, the employment rate for lone parents in the UK before the Labour Government’s 
package of reforms was introduced was as low as 38.7%. This implies a remarkable increase 
in employment of this group of people of about 14 percentage points in the relatively short 
period of six years.  
Table 2. Employment rates of single individuals - UK and Germany, 2002/03 
  Employment rate  in % 
 UK  Germany 
All Singles  67.91 68.17 
Male Singles  71.69 68.20 
Female Singles  63.84 68.14 
Singles without children <17 71.48 69.11 
Singles with children <17  52.43 62.74 
Source: FRS 2002/03 and GSOEP 2003. 
 
Employment rates for people in couples (Table 3) are higher in the UK for both men and 
women, and this is the case for couples with and without children. An interesting similarity 
between the two countries is that the difference in employment rates between those with and 
without children is the same for both countries: about 5-6% for men and 11-12% for women. 
 
Table 3. Employment rates of individuals in couples - UK and Germany, 2002/03 
  Employment rate  in % 
 UK  Germany 
  men women men women 
All couples  87.90 72.36 83.32 66.60 
Couples without children <17  85.35 77.99 79.73 72.83 
Couples with children  <17  90.32 67.03 86.83 60.51 
 Source: FRS 2002/03 and GSOEP 2003. 
  
In Table 4 we break down these employment rates at the level of the couples, by dividing 
couples into two-earner, one-earner (where either the woman or the man works) and no-earner 
couples. This sheds more light on the differences between the two countries. As we can see 
the proportion of two-earner couples is lower in Germany for all couples, regardless of 
whether they have children or not. The overall proportion of no-earner couples is very similar 
at about 7%. It is interesting to note that the proportion of couples where only the woman 
works is almost twice as high in Germany as it is in the UK.  Discussion Papers   555 
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The breakdown of employment rates by family type shows that the differences between the 
two labour markets are far from uniform. There are important groups in the two populations 
in which employment rates are either almost identical or are even higher in Germany than in 
Britain. This raises important questions related to labour market policy response in both coun-
tries. We think that it would be difficult to explain these differences in terms of labour de-
mand factors. These could either be considered to be the same for all individuals regardless of 
their marital and family status, or at least to be the same for specific types of families. One 
could argue, for example, that employers would be less willing to employ individuals with 
parental obligations (for example because of the cost of child-related leave). This should 
however apply equally strongly to lone parents and parents living in couples. In this case the 
employment rates we presented show that, while lone parents are more likely to be employed 
in Germany (employment rate of 62.7% versus 52.4%), the rates for parents in couples are 
higher in Britain for men (90.3% versus 86.8%) and especially for women (67.0% versus 
60.5%).  
The above implies that differences in tax and social security burdens between Germany and 
Britain and the institutional arrangements which affect demand for labour are insufficient to 
explain the differences in employment patterns between the two countries. Explanation of 
differences between employment rates between different family types must therefore largely 
relate to the supply side of the labour market, and thus be a reflection of on the one hand peo-
ple’s preferences for leisure and on the other of differences in financial incentives to work. 
Here the common approach is to argue that the high generosity of the German benefit system 
is to blame for its lower employment rates. Below we look at some details of financial incen-







 Discussion Papers   555 
3 Britain and Germany compared – incentives to work 
  7
Table 4. Employment rates of individuals in couples. UK and Germany, 2002/03. 
Proportion by employment status:  All couples   No child<17 
in family 
Child <17 in 
family 
UK:     
Two-earner  67.17 71.08 63.46 
Single earner – man employed  20.73  14.27  26.86 
Single earner – woman employed  5.20  6.91  3.57 
No-earner 6.90  7.74  6.11 
      
Germany:        
Two-earner 56.80  59.75  53.91 
Single earner – man employed  26.52  19.99  32.91 
Single earner – woman employed  9.81  13.08  6.60 
No-earner 6.88  7.19  6.57 
  Source: FRS 2002/03 and GSOEP 2003. 
3  Britain and Germany compared – incentives to work 
In this section we look at examples of budget constraints which different types of families 
face in Germany and the UK. We focus on the tax and benefit system of the year 2002/03 as 
the above presented statistics represent the population during that year. The analysis sheds 
some doubt on the popular belief that the levels of social assistance in Germany are signifi-
cantly higher. We show that disposable incomes at various levels of employment intensity are 
very similar between the two countries.7 The only noticeable differences in the “shape” of the 
budget constraint are for second earners in couples and at points of highest generosity of in-
work support in the UK. We return to this issue at the end of this section. Note, this compari-
son needs to be interpreted carefully as we focus only on the tax and benefit system but leave 
out a comparison of important institutions, such as labour market institutions, the educational 
system, the generosity and quality of public health care and other types of public expenditure. 
For better comparison, we assume in all examples for Germany that individuals are not eligi-
ble for the insurance based unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld) as this is not a perma-
nent transfer. Instead, households receive means tested social benefits which are the equiva-
lent to the UK Income Support. 
                                                                          
7 Monetary values used for comparative purposes are expressed in euros using the exchange rate of €/₤ = 
0.6821. To express weekly values of net incomes and benefits (as is standard practice in the UK) in monthly 
terms (as is standard in Germany) we multiply weekly values by a factor of 4.35 – the average number of weeks 
in a month. (=365.25/12/7). Discussion Papers   555 
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Figure 1 presents comparisons of budget constraints for two types of families: a single woman 
without children, and a single woman with two children. The budget lines are drawn under the 
assumption that the woman is earning 25
th percentile gross wage for women (specific for each 
country: €7.76 in the UK and €9.92 in Germany). Similar budget lines are drafted for one-
earner couples (Figure 2) and two earner couples (Figure 3). Here we assume that the man is 
working at a country specific 25
th percentile gross wage for men (€10.47 in the UK and 
€12.99 in Germany) and once more we present the budget lines for families without children 
and with two children. 
 Discussion Papers   555 
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Notes: For each country we consider a single woman working at 25
th percentile hourly wage, 
renting at the cost of median rent. 25
th percentile wage for women in Britain is €7.76 and in 
Germany €9.92.  
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Notes: For each country we consider a one earner couple where the man is working at the 25
th per-
centile hourly wage, renting at the cost of median rent. 25
th percentile wage for men in Britain is 
€10.47 and for Germany €12.99.  
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The two figures show that at the lowest levels of earnings, i.e. in scenarios where the families 
qualify for the basic means tested support, disposable incomes of families in Germany and the 
UK, conditional on family type is almost identical. Differences become apparent only at hours 
levels beyond about 20 per week.  
For single people without children the difference in disposable income beyond 20 hours of 
work results primarily because of the higher nominal hourly wage in Germany. Given the 
differences in the tax burden between the two countries this difference falls as income rises. It 
is interesting to note that in the UK incomes of lone parents with two children are higher in 
the range between 26 and 60 working hours.8 This is the result of generous in-work support 
which these families are eligible for in the form of WFTC. The difference is highest (€212 per 
month ) at the level of 36 hours of work per week. 
Beyond the level of about 25 hours of work a one-earner couple without children in Germany 
is better off than in the UK in our example. A couple with two children would be better off in 
Germany at hours level beyond 35, and the difference in disposable income is especially high 
when the earner in the couple works beyond 55 hours per week. From about this point on-
wards the UK example family no longer receives in-work support. At hours above 50 the 
example UK family with children has very similar disposable incomes to the German child-
less couple. 
There are significant differences for one-earner families without children between Germany 
and the UK. At 26 hours of work the UK one-earner couple receives €342 less per month than 
the couple in Germany and the difference remains at above €300 per month for higher levels 
of hours. The factor responsible for it is only partly the difference in the underlying nominal 
gross wages (we do not see a divergence in disposable income for higher levels of hours 
worked). The most important determinant of these differences is income splitting for indi-
viduals in married couples. As we shall see below, this also has important consequences for 
financial incentives of second earners in couples. The higher disposable incomes of families 
with children in Germany relate to income splitting and the receipt of the universal Kinder-
geld (which in 2002 was €154 for every child per month).   
                                                                          
8 The same applies to lone parent families with one child (not shown on Figure 2) in the hours range between 16 
and 54. Discussion Papers   555 
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Notes: For each country we consider a two earner couple where the man is working 40 hours at the 25
th 
percentile male hourly wage, and present changes in family income as a result of the woman working at 
different hours points (the assumed wage for the woman is 25
th percentile female hourly wage), the couple 
is renting at the cost of median rent. 25
th percentile wage for men in Britain is €10.47 and for Germany 
€12.99, while for women respectively €7.76 and €9.92.  
 
For two earner couples we find strong differences between the two countries which are 
mainly due to the income splitting for couples and the exemption of the social security contri-
bution and income taxation up to a certain threshold of individual gross earnings in Germany. 
This threshold was €325 per month in 2002. After this threshold all earnings are due to social 
security contributions and to income taxation if taxable income exceeds the basic tax allow-
ance. At this point, marginal tax rates for the secondary earner are relatively high because of 
the income splitting. Therefore, we observe the kink in the budget line of the secondary earner 
for Germany. This provides strong disincentives for the secondary earner to take up work 
beyond €325. In comparison to comparable households in the UK, households in Germany 
have a higher disposable income. This difference decreases with the number of working hours 
of the secondary earner as the advantage of the income splitting vanishes. The advantage of 
income splitting is also dependent on the wage difference of both spouses (Steiner and Wroh-
lich, 2004). Discussion Papers   555 
4 “Importing” the New Tax Credits to Germany 
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4  “Importing” the New Tax Credits to Germany 
New Tax Credits 
We saw in Section 3 that one of the main differences in terms of the tax and benefit systems 
between the UK and Germany is the system of in-work support. This section begins with a 
brief outline of the current (2005) system of in-work support in the UK. This is followed by a 
discussion of recent tax and benefit changes in Germany and of how we integrate the ele-
ments of the UK system with the current German one. The section ends with some (non-
behavioural) estimates of the costs of the reform and its distributional consequences. 
In April 2003 the Labour Government implemented major changes to the structure of the tax 
and benefit system in the UK. 9 The reform (commonly known as New Tax Credits – NTCs - 
reform) consolidated several elements of support for families with children into the Child Tax 
Credit (CTC)10, an instrument which specifically relates to having children and is independent 
of work status. The CTC is made of a family premium (of about €60 per month) and credits 
for every child in the family. The child credits begin to be withdrawn when gross annual fam-
ily income exceeds €20,400, while the withdrawal rate of the family premium starts when pre 
tax income exceeds €73,300. To preserve financial incentives to work for low income fami-
lies the government introduced the Working Tax Credit (WTC) which retains the condition 
for the minimum number of hours worked characteristic of the Working Families’ Tax Credit 
from the pre-reform system. To receive the WTC one adult in families with children has to 
work at least 16 hours per week, and there is a full time “premium” for those working more 
than 30 hours per week. The WTC is also available for families without children, for which 
the minimum hours condition is 30 hours per week and it begins to be withdrawn once annual 
gross family income exceeds €7,650. The generosity of the NTC support system is presented 
in Figure 4 for a one-earner couple with one child, two children and without children.11 
                                                                          
9 For a detailed discussion of the 2003 reforms see, Brewer et al. (2005). The NTCs also include a generous 
Childcare Credit, additional premiums for families with newborn babies and for working disabled people. These 
are not modeled in our paper.  
10 Specifically: the family and child premiums in Income Support, the child credits from the Working Families’ Tax 
Credit and the Children’s Tax Credit (which was part of the PAYE income tax). 
11 The NTCs also include a generous Childcare Credit, additional premiums for families with newborn babies and 
for working disabled people. These are not modeled in our paper.  Discussion Papers   555 
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Notes: Assumed hourly wage is €10.47 (25
th percentile wage for men in Britain).   
 
Recent Reforms in Germany 
Since 2002/03, the year for which we show the employment statistics in section 2, Germany 
has also seen important changes in the design of the tax and benefit system. Both, income 
taxation and the benefit system have been reformed aiming to improve incentives on the la-
bour market. We think it is important to account for these changes, and therefore we “import” 
the UK system of in-work support taking the 2005 system as the baseline for the reform.  
On the taxation side between the year 2000 and 2005 the German government introduced the 
most ambitious income tax reform in the German post war history. The main aim of the re-
form which was implemented in three steps (2001, 2004 and 2005) was a reduction of the 
burden and distortions of taxation for both companies and private households. By the begin-
ning of 2005, the top marginal rate of the personal income tax has been reduced to 42%, com-
pared to 51% in 2000. In the same period, the lowest marginal tax rate was reduced from 
22.9% to 15%, and the basic tax allowance has been increased from €6,902 to €7,664. The tax 
schedule between 2002 and 2005 was only affected by the second and the third step of the 
reform. The tax relief due to the two last steps amounts to about €20 billion. Haan and Steiner 
(2005) provide a detailed description of the reform and simulate the labour supply and em-Discussion Papers   555 
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ployment effects of the reform. They show that the reform significantly increased labour sup-
ply incentives in particular for households with relatively high income.  
On the transfer side the “Hartz Reform”, implemented between 2003 and 2005, affected work 
incentives in particular those of low income households. For our analysis mainly three poli-
cies of the Hartz legislation are of importance: the Minijob reform, the reform of income 
support and the introduction of a child supplement. The Minijob reform extended the thresh-
old for subsidies of the social security contributions and the exemption from income taxation 
to individual gross earnings up to €400 per month. Further, high marginal tax rates on earn-
ings above this threshold were decreased, by introducing a modified subsidy up to €800per 
months. This reform is described in detail in Steiner and Wrohlich (2005) and its effects on 
work incentives have been estimated by e.g. Steiner and Wrohlich (2005) or Bargain et al. 
(2005). In the course of the Hartz reform the previous means tested social assistance has been 
combined with unemployment assistance. Relative to the year 2002, the income support out 
of work in 2005 is slightly more generous and the withdrawal rate has changed; for more 
detail, see Steiner (2005). The child supplement is similar to an in-work credit as only work-
ing families receive this benefit. However, in comparison with in-work credits implemented 
in other countries, the child supplement is not relatively small transfer and only affects a small 
number of households. Due to the withdrawal design of this instrument in combination with 
the existing income support, the child supplement hardly affects work incentives for families 
with children.  
Introducing UK in-work support to the German system  
The system as of 2005 is used as a baseline for the exercise of “importing” the UK New Tax 
Credits system (henceforth simply “Tax Credits”). The system is implemented maintaining 
the rules which concern the interaction of the Tax Credits with other means-tested benefits. 
Specifically, we assume that income from Tax Credits is included in the means test for in-
come support which is withdrawn at the rate of 100%. As far as generosity of the Tax Credits 
is concerned, we have decided to exclude the family premium element of the UK’s CTC. This 
is done on the grounds that such extension of child-related support rather far up the income 
distribution in the system with already high level of universal support (for the first three chil-
dren, €154 per child per month) would be very costly and therefore unlikely to be imple-
mented. The resulting changes in the budget constraint are demonstrated on Figures 5 and 6, 
for single people and couples respectively. Figure 5 shows budget constraints for a single Discussion Papers   555 
4 “Importing” the New Tax Credits to Germany 
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person with and without children, working at the 25
th percentile female hourly wage (€9.92). 
In Figure 6 we present budget lines for a couple household with one child. One set of lines 
shows the budget constraints under the assumption that only one partner is working at the 
median wage for men (€16.81), while the other set shows constraints for the second earner 
working at the 25
th percentile female wage (€9.92), under the assumption that the first earner 
works full time at the median wage for men. For all example families we show budget con-
straints as they were in 2002, then the constraints of the baseline - 2005 - system, and finally 
the budget constraints which would result from introducing the Tax Credits in Germany.   
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Two children - 2002 Two children - 2005 Two children - Tax Credits
No children - 2002 No children - 2005 No children - Tax Credits
 
Notes: We consider a single woman working at 25
th percentile hourly wage, renting at the cost of 
median rent. 25
th percentile wage in Germany €9.92. 
 
We show that single individuals without children would be only marginally affected by the 
introduction of Tax Credits – this is represented by a small increase in disposable income at 
30 hours of work relative to the 2005 system. The same is true for childless couples who 
would not be affected at all if the earner receives the median male hourly wage (we therefore 
do not present budget constraints for childless couples in the figures). Tax Credits, however 
lead to substantial income increases for lone parents and couples with children. A lone parent 
with two children earning 25
th percentile female hourly wage would see her income rise by 
€145.40 per month at 16 hours of work and by €250.50 at 39 hours of work. A one earner 
couple with two children, on the other hand, could see its income rise by as much as €456 per 
month (at 32 hours of work). An interesting point to note is that the combination of with-Discussion Papers   555 
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drawal of subsidies of social security contributions and the Tax Credits implies that the differ-
ence in family disposable income resulting from the work of the second falls from €441.70 to 
€155.06 per month as a result of introducing the Tax Credits. As we shall see below this type 
of income effect would lead to important withdrawals from employment among two earner 
couples. 
Disregarding behavioural effects of such a reform, the overall net cost of introducing Tax 
Credits in Germany is about €11 billion. The government would need to spend about €19 
billion on the Tax Credits, but the cost of the means tested income benefits (ALG II) would 
fall by about €8 billion. The reforms would have a rather clear distributional effect – with 
families in the second and third decile gaining most (respectively €52.10 (4.0%) and €60.00 
(3.7%) per month on average) and the gains falling for households higher up the income 
scale. Families in the first decile would gain on average only about €25.80 (3.4%) which is 
because first of all there are fewer families with children in the first decile, and secondly be-
cause many of the poorest families do not meet the hours condition to be eligible for Tax 
Credits.12 
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First earner - 2002 First earner - 2005 First earner - Tax Credits
Second earner - 2002 Second earner - 2005 Second earner - Tax Credits
 
Notes: For each country we consider a couple where the first earner is a man working at the 25
th percentile 
male hourly wage, and the second earner is considered under the assumption that her partner works 40 
hours per week (at 25
th percentile hourly wage) – the assumed wage for the woman is 25
th percentile female 
hourly wage, the couple is renting at the cost of median rent. 25
th percentile wage for men is €10.47 and for 
women €9.92.  
 
                                                                          
12 We do not present full distributional and reform cost details here. These are available from the authors.  Discussion Papers   555 
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5  Tax Credits and labour supply 
In order to evaluate the behavioural effects of introducing Tax Credits in Germany we esti-
mate the labour supply responses of households. We follow the method of Blundell et al. 
(2000) by simulating the changes in working hours and labour market participation on the 
basis of a discrete choice labour supply model. The main advantage of the discrete choice 
approach compared to continuous specifications of labour supply derives from the possibility 
to model nonlinearities in budget functions.13 Furthermore the modelling allows to asses the 
labour supply effects on the household level rather the individual level, by specifying a joint 
labour supply model for cohabiting and married couples. A detailed specification of the model 
can be found in the Appendix; for further information with descriptive statistics and a discus-
sion of the main results, see Bargain et al. (2005). Note, we follow Blundell et al. (2000) and 
assume that households can freely choose their working hours and are not restricted by labour 
demand constraints. We estimate the model on a restricted sample of households where both 
spouses are aged between 25 and 59, not in education and not self employed.14 The database 
is the GSOEP 2003, hence we estimate the preferences for work and disposable income for 
the fiscal year 2002.15 
Based on the labour supply estimation we simulate the labour supply effects resulting from 
the introduction of the Tax Credits. Using the microsimulation model STSM  that models the 
German tax and benefit system in detail (Steiner et al. 2005) we simulate the net household 
income for two scenarios at the defined discrete hours points: i) the fiscal system of the year 
2005 that includes the implemented reforms between 2002 and 2005 described in section 4 
and ii) a hypothetical scenario in which we introduce the Tax Credits into the system of 2005 
as described in section 4. For each household we simulate the probabilities of choosing each 
point for the status quo scenario 2002 and the two simulated scenarios. The differences in the 
probabilities yield the labour supply responses induced by the respective reforms.  
                                                                          
13 We assume that working hours can be described by a distribution with 6 discrete points. We define on  hours 
intervals (0, [0,12], [12,20], [20,34], [34,40], >40) according to the empirical distribution in the data (GSOEP 
2003). The empirical mean of the distribution describes the discrete hours point. For couples we assume a joint 
labour supply model and specify 6x6 discrete points. For more details, see Bargain et al. (2005).  
14 We have estimated the effect of TCs on couples where one spouse is either self employed, in education or 
retired, or older than 59. We find that the effects for both men and women are negligible. Simulation results for 
these groups can be obtained from the authors.  
15 We cannot estimate preferences directly for the year 2005 as the data for the fiscal year 2005 is not yet avail-
able.  Discussion Papers   555 
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In order to disentangle the work incentives resulting from the introduction of the Tax Credits 
we calculate the difference of the employment effects induced by the two simulated scenarios. 
Tables (5–8) present the labour supply effects by household types and region both regarding 
changes in employment and working hours. Discussion Papers   555 
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Single Households 
As discussed above the Tax Credits provide positive labour supply incentives for single 
households, in particular for lone parents as TCs are most generous for this group. We simu-
late that the overall employment rate of single women increases by more then 95,000 or about 
2.9%. This effect is almost exclusively borne by lone mothers. Single women without chil-
dren in the western part of Germany do hardly change their labour supply behaviour, the same 
group in the east reacts slightly more. This is due to the higher gains from the Tax Credits 
reform for east Germans as their average earnings are markedly lower than in the western part 
of the country. The same holds true for lone mothers. The relative change in participation in 
east Germany (at 15%) is more than twice as high as the change for west German lone moth-
ers (6.5%). A very similar picture emerges turning to the changes in the weekly working 
hours.  
For single men the effects of the Tax Credits are relatively modest, the main reason being that 
the number of lone fathers in Germany is very low. The overall participation effect amounts 
to about 10,000 which translates to a relative increase of 0.34%. Again, effects in east Ger-
many are higher, both in relative and in absolute numbers. The impact on the working hours 
of single men is moderate, as well. Weekly working hours increase by about 0.30%. 
Couple Households 
The overall effect of the Tax Credits on the labour supply of men and women living in cou-
ples is negative. As discussed above this is because the Tax Credits is based on household 
rather than on individual earnings and for eligibility only one spouse needs to fulfill the work-
ing requirements. The total employment among women in couples decreases by more than 
55,000 which amounts to a decrease of about 0.8%. Again the effect is mainly borne by 
women with children. The effect on couple households without children is basically zero. As 
for single women, the effect on the participation rate and the relative change in working hours 
for women in east Germany are higher. For men living in couples, we find smaller negative 
effects of the Tax Credits. Employment among men in couple households decreases by about 
13,000 or 0.16%. The reduction in working hours is relatively high (-0,46%), as the share of 
men working full time or over time in the baseline scenario is high.  Discussion Papers   555 
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Table 5. Effect of Tax Credits on single individuals 
      
  Change in participation  Change in number of hours 
(unconditional) 
  absolute: in  %: absolute 
(in 000s):  in %: 
Women:      
   West         
   - no children  400  0.019  28.6  0.041 
   - with children  59,400  6.474  1676.4  5.953 
   East         
   - no children  1,000  0.356  63.2  0.588 
   - with children  34,500  15.002  1244.8  15.166 
   All  95,300 2.914 3013.0 2.583 
      
Men:      
   with children  2,400  1.728  92.1  1.634 
   without children  7,200  0.273  279.4  0.260 
   West  3,900  0.167  132.5  0.139 
   East  5,700  1.239  222.7  1.209 
   All  9,600 0.344 355.2 0.312 
Notes: Simulation built by drawing 100 times from the distribution of the unobserved heterogene-
ity and allocating each observation to the alternative that yields maximum utility (e.g. see Blundell 
et al. 2002). Absolute change in participation rounded to nearest 100.  
 
Table 6. Effect of Tax Credits on individuals in couples 
      
  Change in participation  Change in number of hours 
(unconditional) 
  absolute: in  %: absolute 
(in 000s):  in %: 
Women      
   West         
   - no children  100  0.005  4.9  0.006 
   - with children  -43000  -1.330  -1033.3  -1.405 
   East         
   - no children  0  -0.002  1.1  0.008 
   - with children  -12600  -1.499  -635.7  -2.169 
Total – women  -55500 -0.813 -1663.0 -0.850 
      
Men      
   West         
   - no children  -100  -0.004  -5.0  -0.005 
   - with children  -2000  -0.044  -956.7  -0.494 
   East         
   - no children  -100  -0.016  -3.7  -0.019 
   - with children  -11300  -1.268  -656.9  -1.708 
Total – men  -13400 -0.163 -1622.2 -0.460 
Notes: Simulation built by drawing 100 times from the distribution of the unobserved heterogene-
ity and allocating each observation to the alternative that yields maximum utility (e.g. see Blundell 
et al. 2002). Absolute change in participation rounded to nearest 100.  Discussion Papers   555 
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Effect by employment status of the spouses 
As shown in Table 4, in Germany the share of couple households where both spouses are 
working is relatively low in comparison to the UK. In contrast, the share of one earner house-
holds is relatively high. Our findings indicate that the introduction of the UK style Tax Credit 
further increases the differences between the two countries in this respect. In order to accu-
rately simulate the impact of the Tax Credits by employment status of the spouses we have to 
compare the participation effect relative to the base scenario in 2002 since the employment 
status can be only observed in this year. The first column in Table 7 yields the observed num-
ber of household within each group for the year 2002, the second column the simulated effect 
for the fiscal year 2005, and the third column the simulated effects for the hypothetical system 
including the Tax Credits. In order to disentangle the effect of the Tax Credit we take the 
difference between the employment effect of the two simulated systems (column 4).  
As a result of introducing the Tax Credits we observe an employment effect for couples 
where both spouses were not working in 2002. Relative to the fiscal system in the year 2005 
this effect is particularly high for men (26,000) but is also non-negligible for women (8,500). 
As shown in Table 4, one earner couples where the man is working are far more common in 
Germany than couples where the women is the sole earner. This explains the stronger increase 
for men than for women. 
This positive employment effect is clearly outweighed by the negative effect of the Tax Cred-
its on the other groups. In particular the number of couples where both spouses used to work 
in the year 2002 markedly decreases. The effect of the Tax Credit implies that more than 
50,000 women and nearly 30,000 men leave this group. The effect on one earner couples is 
relatively small. In comparison to the effects of the fiscal system in 2005, the impact of the 
Tax Credits slightly reduces employment within these groups, both for men and women.  
These results imply that due to the Tax Credits the share of two earner couples in Germany 
would further decrease widening the gap between the UK and Germany. Further, the decom-
position by employment status of the couples underlines the importance to estimate not only 
the labour supply effects of women but also of men. We show that the Tax  Credits have a 
strong impact on male employment decision, positive or negative, dependent on their initial 
employment state.  
 Discussion Papers   555 
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Table 7. Effect of Tax Credits on couples conditional on combination of partners’ employment. 






Effect of TCs 
(in 000s) 
Women:        
            
   - (0,0)  0.0  23.6  32.0  8.5 
   - (1,0)  0.0  82.6  76.3  -6.3 
   - (0,1)  478.3  473.8  469.9  -3.9 
   - (1,1)  6339.8  6314.1  6260.3  -53.8 
        
Men:        
            
   - (0,0)  0.0  27.0  53.1  26.1 
   - (1,0)  2093.9  2079.8  2072.0  -7.8 
   - (0,1)  0.0  35.3  33.5  -1.8 
   - (1,1)  6121.2  6097.4  6067.6  -29.9 
Notes: Simulation built by drawing 100 times from the distribution of the unobserved heterogene-
ity and allocating each observation to the alternative that yields maximum utility (e.g. see Blundell 
et al. 2002).  
 
Labour supply effects of in-work support in other studies 
Bargain and Orsini (2005) simulate the labour supply effects of the British WFTC as it was 
implemented in 1999 for single women and women in couples for several countries, amongst 
others for Germany. In general, our results point in the same direction as their findings. Bar-
gain and Orsini (2005) show that the in-work credit has a positive effect on the labour supply 
behaviour of single women and a negative effect on behaviour of women living in couples. 
However, they find that the negative effects of women in couples outweighs the positive ef-
fect of singles. This difference is mainly due to the different generosity of the simulated in-
work credits. In comparison to the studies of Blundell at al. (2000) and Gregg et al. (1999) 
which focus on the effects of the WFTC reform 1999 in the UK, we find greater labour supply 
effects, which is not surprising since we model the introduction of the full system and not 
only increases in its generosity (as is the case in these two studies). The important difference 
between the results for UK and Germany are results for couples. Both UK studies (as well as 
subsequent estimates of the effect of the WFTC, e.g. Brewer et al., 2005, Blundell et al., 
2005, Myck and Reed, 2005) find positive net effects on employment of men in couples. For 
Germany we find that over 13,000 men living in couples would leave employment. Moreover 
if we take the overall employment effect on individuals living in couples measured as a pro-
portion of the positive effect on single individuals, we find that it is –19% in the case of Discussion Papers   555 
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Blundell et. al (2000) and is positive (+14%) in the case of Gregg et al. (1999).16 In the case 
of our estimation we find that the negative effect on couples is –66% of the effect on single 
people. This suggests a very different (relative) responsiveness among individuals in couples 
in Germany and calls for a lot of caution in applying means-tested policies based on total 
family income.  
6  Can Tax Credits “do the trick”? 
We saw in the above section that the introduction of Tax Credits in Germany would have an 
overall positive effect on employment but this effect would be small (in the range of 35,000) 
and there would be a negative effect on labour supply of individuals in couples in the range of 
70,000. The principal reason behind the effect on couples is that the income effect of the pol-
icy on second earners would lead many of them to give up employment. This negative effect 
on two-earner couples would not be outweighed by increases in employment among couples 
in which (in the baseline scenario) both partners are out of work.  
Below we return to the analysis of employment statistics. On the one hand this is done to find 
an explanation for our results in the patterns of employment in Germany. On the other hand 
we want to look more closely at families with children to see if differences in employment 
between Britain and Germany suggest any specific groups which could be targeted from the 
point of view of employment policy.  
In tables 8, 9 and 10 we present a further breakdown of employment rates for men and women 
with children. The additional disaggregation is conditional on the age of the youngest child in 
the family, and we divide the sample into those with youngest children aged 0-3, 4-6 and 7-
16. As in Section 2 statistics are presented for single people (Table 8) and couples (Table 9), 
and Table 10 presents the proportion of couples with children conditional on the employment 
status of the parents.  
                                                                          
16 We refer to the updated version of Gregg et al. results given in Blundell and Reed (2000). Discussion Papers   555 
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Table 8. Employment rates of single individuals. UK and Germany, 2002/03. 
  Employment rate  in % 
 UK  Germany 
Singles with children <17  52.43  62.74 
    
Singles with children: youngest 0-3  33.08  32.30 
Singles with children: youngest 4-6  50.78  49.10 
Singles with children: youngest 7-16  60.26  73.37 
Source: FRS 2002/03 and GSOEP 2003. 
 
Table 9. Employment rates of individuals in couples. UK and Germany, 2002/03. 
  Employment rate  in % 
 UK  Germany 
  men women men women 
Couples  with  kids  <17  90.32 67.03 86.83 60.51 
      
Couples with kids – youngest: 0-3  92.53  51.77  83.74  40.02 
Couples with kids – youngest: 4-6  89.64  67.41  89.53  58.37 
Couples with kids – youngest: 7-16  89.16  76.57  87.60  72.34 
Source: FRS 2002/03 and GSOEP 2003. 
 
Table 10. Employment rates of individuals in couples. UK and Germany, 2002/03. 








UK:      
Two-earner  63.46 50.06 64.45 71.60 
Single earner – man employed  26.86  42.47  25.18  17.55 
Single earner – woman employed  3.57  1.71  2.95  4.97 
No-earner 6.11  5.77  7.41  5.87 
        
Germany:        
Two-earner 53.91  34.42  54.58  64.26 
Single earner – man employed  32.91  49.32  34.95  23.34 
Single earner – woman employed  6.60  5.59  3.79  8.09 
No-earner 6.57  10.67  6.68  4.32 
Source: FRS 2002/03 and GSOEP 2003. Discussion Papers   555 
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Several interesting facts emerge from this additional disaggregation of employment statistics. 
First of all, the group of lone parents “responsible” for the relatively higher employment rates 
among single people in Germany seems to be the lone parents with school-age children. Only 
for this group there is a big difference in employment rates with 73.4% of lone parents with 
school-age children employed in Germany and only 60.3% in Great Britain. Looking at the 
average employment rates for lone parents in Germany we could conclude that (at least rela-
tive to Britain) employment among this group does not seem to be a major concern. However, 
given that there is this large discrepancy within Germany in employment rates between par-
ents with pre-school and school-age children, perhaps addressing factors constraining parents 
of younger children from taking-up employment would be an efficient way to increase the 
overall employment rate. As we showed the Tax Credits are every effective in increasing 
employment of single people. Over 100,000 individuals would move into work following the 
introduction of Tax Credits. Given the design of the implemented system, the effect would be 
high especially among lone parents (over 96,000). Of these 44,000 have children below 
school age, so Tax Credits could play an important role in increasing employment among this 
group. The policy could be extended to include childcare support (as is the case in the UK) 
and then the effect on parents with youngest children would most probably be even higher.17  
Differences in employment rates for individuals living in couples between Great Britain and 
Germany also vary by the age of the youngest child. Among men the group which seems to 
“turn” the overall employment statistic for fathers in Britain’s favour is the fathers with very 
young children (aged 0-3). For this group the employment rate in Britain is 92.5%, while in 
Germany only 83.7%. On the other hand we once again find that for women the difference in 
employment rates is smallest among those in couples with school-age children, so as in the 
case of lone parents Germany is lagging behind the UK as far as employment of people with 
pre-school age children is concerned. It is these groups of individuals in couples where we 
saw highest increases in employment since 1996 in the UK (see Appendix Table A3) and so 
perhaps a form of in-work support could be used to encourage employment among these 
groups in Germany as well. Yet, as we argued above the extent of the negative employment 
effect of Tax Credits in Germany (relatively) much higher than in the UK, and such an in-
work support policy could backfire and result in lower and not higher employment among 
individuals in couples. Clearly, as in the case of lone parents, assistance with childcare could 
                                                                          
17 For discussion of German childcare policy see e.g.  Wrohlich (2005). Discussion Papers   555 
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encourage more individuals from no-earner couples to take-up employment, but this may still 
not be enough to outweigh the negative response of second earners in two-earner couples.  
Thus if the German government considers low employment levels among couples with chil-
dren to be an area of concern then perhaps it would be more effective to consider other poli-
cies supporting the low paid in work and targeted at the secondary earner. Such policies could 
include a move away from joint taxation (see Steiner and Wrohlich 2004) and perhaps some 
form of an individual tax credit (based on individual and not family income). The latter policy 
could bring the desired effects of increasing employment among lone parents and would not 
have an equally strong disincentive effects on second earners in couples.18 Given the differ-
ences between Britain and Germany in the pattern of employment conditional on the age of 
the youngest child perhaps the policies could be focused on specific groups of parents.     
7 Conclusion 
Estimates of labour supply effects of recent UK reforms in the area of direct taxes and bene-
fits show that policy can have significant influence on the level of employment. We confirm 
this in a simulation of in-work support system on German data. Our simulation results suggest 
that introducing in-work Tax Credits in Germany would increase employment of single indi-
viduals by over 100,000 but it would result in a reduction of labour supply among individuals 
in couples by about 70,000.  
Our analysis of employment rates demonstrated that differences in employment between 
Germany and Britain are far from homogenous across different family types. This relates 
especially to patterns of employment within couples where one-earner families are much 
more common in Germany. “Importing” a UK-style in-work support system to Germany 
would further increase this difference. Results of our simulations suggest that Tax Credits 
would result in significant reductions of labour supply both among women and men in two 
earner couples. These reductions would not be matched by increases in labour supply among 
one-earner or no-earner couples, so the overall labour supply effects would be negative for 
both men and women. The result found for men is especially important as it is markedly dif-
ferent from all results found for the UK, where the overall response among men has always 
                                                                          
18 A system of individual tax credits could replace the Mini-job subsidies which support employment at very low 
hours of work.  Discussion Papers   555 
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been found positive. These estimated effects call for a high degree of caution as far as “im-
porting” UK-style Tax Credits to Germany is concerned. In-work support based on family 
income would increase the proportion of one-earner couples and reduce employment levels of 
both men and women living in couples.  
Comparing budget constraints derived on the basis of the 2002 tax and benefit systems for 
several stylised types of families we showed that, contrary to a “popular belief”, the basic 
German system of support for the poorest groups of the population is not more generous rela-
tive to its British counterpart. This implies that, at least relative to the UK system, there is 
little room for policies aimed at increasing employment through reductions in the values of 
support at the lower end of the income distribution. The most important two differences be-
tween the two tax and benefits systems (as reflected in the budget constraints) are in-work 
support and joint taxation of couples. While, as noted above, in-work support conditional on 
joint family income may not be the best solution for Germany from the point of view of in-
creasing employment rates of individuals in couples, this does not mean that every form of in-
work support would fail. In fact the simulation results for singles are encouraging and, as we 
argued, if combined with childcare support could result in even higher employment response 
than that estimated in this paper. Implementing Tax Credits for couples, however, would need 
to take into account the interaction of labour supplies of both partners, and so perhaps be 
based on individual, rather than joint family income. Given employment patterns among cou-
ples with children an option to consider would also be to limit tax credits only to couples with 
youngest children. As Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) demonstrated the system of joint taxation 
of couples is to some extent responsible for the employment patterns we observe in Germany. 
A careful combination of a move away from joint taxation with a cautious design of in-work 
support could perhaps “do the trick”. 




Discrete Choice Labour Supply Estimation 
Discrete choice models of labour supply are based on the assumption that a household can 
choose among a finite number J+1 of working hours (J positive hours points and non-
participation); each hour j=0,.J corresponds to a given level of disposable income Cij and each 
discrete bundle of leisure and income provides a different level of utility. In effect, choices 
j=0,...J in a couple correspond simply to all the combinations of the spouses' discrete hours 
(see for instance van Soest (1995)). The utility Vij derived by household i from making choice 
j is assumed to depend on a function U of spouses' leisures Lfij, Lmij, disposable income Cij  
and household characteristics Zi, and on a random term εij. When the error term εij is assumed 
to be identically and independently distributed across alternatives and households according 
to a Extreme Value distribution, McFadden (1974) proves that the probability that alternative 
















The likelihood for a sample of observed choices can be derived from that expression and 
maximised to estimate the parameters of function U. We assume a quadratic specification of 
the utility function as in Blundell et al.(2000). In the estimation we do not consider potential 
effects of unobserved heterogeneity, which implies that the independence of irrelevant alter-
natives (IIA) property holds. However, Haan (2006) has shown that labour supply elasticties, 
estimated on the same data as in the present study, do not differ significantly when unob-
served heterogeneity is introduced. 
We estimate three separate models: labour supply of 706 single men, labour supply of 902 
single women, and a joint labour supply model for  men and women in couples (3367). The 
full specification of the model and results of the estimations are discussed in detail in Bargain 
et al. (2005). 
Simulating Employment Effects 
In the present non-linear model labour employment effects need to be derived numerically. 
Instead of the `aggregated frequencies´ technique, that is aggregating over the whole sample Discussion Papers   555 
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the expected individual hour supply, we follow the calibration method, which is consistent 
with the probabilistic nature of the model at the individual level (Creedy and Duncan 2002). It 
consists of drawing for each household a set of J+1 random terms from the Extreme Value 
distribution until a vector of random terms is found  that generates a perfect match between 
predicted and observed hour supply. In a second step, the draws are used for predicting labour 
supply responses to a tax reform, and averaging them over a large number of draws provides 
robust transition matrices. 
Tables: 
Table A1. Employment rates of single individuals. UK, 1996 and 1999. 
  Employment rate  in % 
  UK - 1996  UK - 1999 
All Singles  61.93  65.89 
Male Singles  67.46  70.18 
Female Singles  56.00  60.90 
Singles without children <17  68.02  70.52 
Singles with children <17  38.67  46.51 
Singles with children: youngest 0-3  21.82  25.92 
Singles with children: youngest 4-6  34.64  43.08 
Singles with children: youngest 7-16  48.33  56.51 
Source: FRS 1996 & 1999. 
Table A2. Employment rates of individuals in couples. UK, 1996 and 1999. 
  Employment rate  in % 
  UK - 1996  UK - 1999 
  men women men women 
All  couple  84.74 69.39 86.82 71.93 
Couples  no  kids  <17  82.50 75.30 84.52 76.94 
Couples  with  kids  <17  86.89 63.70 89.07 67.00 
Couples with kids – youngest: 0-3  87.26  49.82  90.92  53.23 
Couples with kids – youngest: 4-6  86.73  65.13  89.60  68.40 
Couples with kids – youngest: 7-16  86.66  74.16  87.62  75.91 
Source: FRS 1996 & 1999. 
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Table A3. Employment rates of individuals in couples. UK, 1996 and 1999. 
















UK – 1996:        
Two-earner 63.69  67.47  60.05  47.62  61.96  69.19 
Single earner – man employed  21.05  15.03  26.84  39.64  24.77  17.47 
Single earner – woman employed  5.70  7.83  3.65  2.20  3.17  4.97 
No-earner 9.57  9.67  9.46  10.54  10.09  8.37 
Number of couples (in 1,000s)  9361  4589  4772  1745  826  2201 
UK – 1999:        
Two-earner 66.52  69.87  63.23  50.93  64.61  71.15 
Single earner – man employed  20.30  14.65  25.84  39.99  24.99  16.47 
Single earner – woman employed  5.41  7.07  3.77  2.30  3.79  4.76 
No-earner  7.77 8.40 7.16 6.78 6.61 7.61 
Number of couples (in 1,000s)  9,219  4,568  4,651  1,559  811  2,281 
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